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RAILROAD MORTGAGES-PREFERENCE OF MATERIAL MEN.
The present number of the Supreme Court Reporter (20 Sup.Ct., No. 8) contains in the two cases of Southern Railway Co. v.
Carnegie Steel Co., Limited, p. 347, and Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co.
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., p. 363, a valuable exposition of thelaw as to the preference that claims against the current income of a
railroad have over a mortgage debt. In the Carnegie Steel Co. case
a cl aim for steel rails furnished eleven months prior to the appoint-
ment of a receivership over the railroad, the rails being necessary
to keep the road in running order, was given preference over the
claims of mortgage creditors. The law as to this was settled in the
case of Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, on grounds so logical and
eminently just that its authority is unquestionable. But in the pres-
ent case the time limit of six months, the extreme time yet set within
which claims must be created in order to acquire this preference, is
broken in upon for the first time. Turner v. Indianapolis, 8 Biss.(U. S.) 315. The principle of Fosdick v. Schall is that certain claims
are of such a nature that the creditors look to the- current earnings
of the road for their payment. Current earnings are matters of at
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least yearly compilation. It would seem therefore that the eleven
months allowed in the present case is about the limit within which
such claims can be created and priority given to them. Debts older
than this raise at least the presumption that they rely more upon the
general credit of the company for satisfaction than upon the current
expenses. When such is the case the principles of Fosdick v. Schall
hardly apply. Thomas v. Peoria R. R., 36 Fed. 8o8. The principles
to be drawn from the present decisions of the Supreme Court seem
to be briefly these: In order to give preference to the claims of
material men over mortgage creditors (i) such claims must be
created within some limited time to be settled by the circumstances
of each case; (2) they must be against the current earnings of the
road, not against its general credit; (3) they must not be secured
by collateral security; (4) they must be for such repairs to the road
as are required to put it in safe condition, and not so extensive as to
amount to practical reconstruction; (5) they must be for a special
kind of material and labor. These principles should be kept clearly
in mind, for some State courts have gone so far as to say that almost
every claim of material men against a railroad must be paid before
the mortgagee. Such a decision is undoubtedly wrong, not only
being unjust to him who has lent the railroad his money, but also
giving a greater security to some creditors than they deserve. The
principle of Fosdick v. Schall is undoubtedly good law within the
limits that seemed well established prior to this Carnegie Steel Co.
case, and while the change made by this case seems proper and just,
a limit has now been reached by this decision which it would seem
can not be overstepped with impunity.
ENGAGEMENT TO MARRY, A STATUS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The authorities are united in distinguishing marriage from
ordinary civil contracts, declaring it the most prominent of that
class of contractual relationships, each of which is termed a status;
Schouler Dom. Rel., sec. 13. Nevertheless is not the agreement to
enter into this status at a future time in itself simply an executory
agreement, the peculiar properties of the marriage relationship not
attaching until the executory contract is consummated and the legal
status brought into being? There are many authorities to this effect,
declaring that an agreement to marry is affected by the various
rules and regulations which govern any contract, and if the promise
is not to be performed within one year it falls within the fourth
section of the Statute of Frauds, requiring such contracts to be in
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writing. Uliman v. Meyer, Io Fed. 241 ; Nichols v. Weaver, 7 Kans.
373. Confusion has arisen, in cases which apparently are at variance
with these authorities, by a failure to distinguish between an agree-
ment to marry at a certain time and a promise to marry within such
time. In the latter case the agreement may be performed at any
time; hence, it does not fall within the provision of the statute re-
specting agreements which are not to be performed within a certain
time. Lawrence v. Cooke, 56 Me. 193; Linscott v. Mclntire, 15 Me.
201.
In the recent case of Lewis v. Tapman, 45 Atl. Rep. 459 (Md.),
the court recognizes the above distinctions, but still declares that
the agreement to marry, not to be performed within a year, is not
affected by the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds. Chief Justice
McSherry, writing the opinion of the court, associates the nature of
an engagement so intimately with that of marriage that he attributes
to the former the peculiarities of a status, such as marriage itself
possesses. It is difficult to see how the authorities support this
position. The leading cases opposing the necessity of a writing
to evidence an agreement to marry not to be performed within a
year, are, first, the case of Brick v. Flannigan, 36 Hun. (N. Y.) 52,
which takes such position for the reason that the title to the New
York Statute of Frauds clearly indicates that it is to apply only to
goods, chattels and things in action; and, second, the case of
Blackman v. Mann, 85 Ill. 222, which announces the more difficult
doctrine of a continuing contract, by which it is considered that so
long as the parties exchange the various attentions incident to an
engagement, so long do they each continually promise the other
to consummate the marriage at the specified time. But if these
attentions cease, and if the date of marriage is further removed
from such time than a year, the statute applies. This is suggested
in the same case which announces the rule.
Hence, the case under consideration is clearly a new step in the
direction of elevating the importance of an engagement to marry,
giving it such attributes of a status that under no circumstances
does the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds apply. The court
founds its conclusion also on the doctrine that there was no civil
action for the breach of a promise to marry when the Statute of
Frauds was passed, hence the statute does not apply to such agree-
ments. But in this connection it must be remembered that numer-
ous contractual remedies have been granted since the passage of that
statute, which then were denied; and that each has been brought
to the test ,of the statute's provisions. Derby v. Phelps, 2 N. H..515.
CO.MMENT.
INJURY TO UNBORN CHILD--ITS RIGHT TO SUE.
In the fall term of the Superior Court of Hartford County,
Conn., Roraback, J., decided that an infant could not maintain an
action for injuries received while in "ventre sa mere." We find the
same point decided in the same way in Allaire v. St. Lukes Hospital,
56 N. E. Rep. 638, Boggs, J., dissenting. We infer that the court
makes no distinction between injuries arising from negligence or
intention, by the mother or third parties; or resulting from wrongful
act of one having notice of its existence and paid for its care, and
one who has no knowledge of its existence whatever. The reasons
given are that the infant in its prenatal stage is "pars viscerum
matris;" and that no precedent can be shown to support this
unheard-of action.
The two prior cases against the infant's right to sue are differ-
entiated from the present one, in that, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (decided in 1884), was an action by the
administrator'for a child prematurely born and dying immediately,
while the infant here survived; and that in Walker v. Railway Co.,
28 L. R. A. (decided in i89I), the ground of the decision was the
lack of notice on the part of the railway company of the child's
existence; the defendants here knowing the mother to be enceinte
and receiving pay for care of mother and child.
At the earliest common law the infant was "pars viscerum
matris" merely. But the rule of the civil law considering it as in
esse for all beneficial purposes soon softened the rigor of the com-
mon law. The infant could take by devise and under the statute
of distributions; could be vouched on a recovery, be an execution,
and have an injunction lie in its favor. Hellerson v. Woodford, 4
Ves. 227. In this case Bullor, J., asked: "Why should not chil-
dren in ventre sa mere be considered as generally in existence?
They are entitled to all the privileges of other persons." As to
property rights this principle is undisputed. Is there sufficient rea-
son to keep it from including actions of tort?
In Walker v. Railway Co., cited supra, which contains the learn-
ing on this subject, the chief justice was non-committal, the others
against this right. In arguing against it, O'Brien, Asst. J., puts
very forcibly the impossibility of proof, and the danger of making
"lusus scientim" out of "lusus nature" in a court of law. There
is force in this, but not enough, we submit, to justify depriving an
infant of his action, where he can show the causal connection,
merely because of the difficulty of proof in general. Were a
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doctor deliberately and with malice, to put out the eyes of an unborn
infant, should not the infant, if it survives, have its action? Its
injury is the mother's only by a fiction of the law-perhaps the
mother could only sue for loss of services; a loss insignificant com-
pared to the infant's loss of his eyes. -The loss is peculiarly his, and
will have to be born by him while he lives, so there seems no good
reason why in such a case it should not recover from the wrong
doer.
It is true there is no precedent. As such occurrences are not
infrequent, as observed by O'Brien, Asst. J., in Walker v. Railway
Co.; this bears against the right, but not, we think, conclusively.
"Precedents," says Mansfield, J., "were to illustrate principles and
give them fixed certainty." While there is no precedent, the civil
law rule considering the infant as "in esse" when it was for its
benefit to do so, is a living principle in our law to-day, and there
seems to be no such distinction between rights of property and
rights to actions of.tort, to admit the infant to one and exclude it
from the other. Under Lord Campbell's and similar acts, an infant
"in ventre sa mere" can sue for the death of its relative that took
place while it was yet unborn. The George v. Richard, L. R. 3 Adm.
& Ecc. 466; Nelson v. Galveston R. R., 78 Tex. 62.
Although the Illinois court did not consider the argument by
analogy of O'Brien, C. J., in Walker v. Railway, cited supra, and
although the learned chief justice left it "an open question," his
reasoning seems very convincing. It is undisputed that the State
can punish as murder or manslaughter a wilful injury to an unborn
infant, that results in death after parturition has taken place and its
independent existence has begun. Now, if all crimes are also private
wrongs, affecting the individual and also the State, 4 Black. 6, the
infant has suffered a private wrong. Is it any less a private wrong
if instead of being killed the infant was crippled for life? There
seems no cogent reason for giving to an infant for purposes of right-
ing public wrongs a status that is to be denied it when seeking
redress for its private wrongs.
If this right is given, it is clear that it should be restricted. In
the early period of gestation, as remarked by Boggs, J., in the pres-
ent case, the infant may well be considered as "pars viscerum
matris." But when the foetus reaches a stage, where, if the mother
should die, it might live, as was the case in Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hospital, justice might best be subserved by giving the infant his
action.
